Research · Working paper
Social Security Design and its Political Support
Political economy
In short
A politico-economic equilibrium model of how pension design affects labour supply, savings and political support for intergenerational transfers. Making pensions universal, unrelated to labour income, increases political support for higher pensions and worsens the problem of an ageing population.
Cite
@unpublished{Berg2023:social-security-design,
author = {Berg, Rasmus Kehlet Skjødt and Gonzalez-Eiras, Martín},
title = {{Social Security Design and its Political Support}},
note = {SSRN Working Paper},
year = {2023},
doi = {10.2139/ssrn.4383618},
url = {https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4383618}
}